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DEFINING "RELIGION" IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation.
ChiefJustice Hughes, 1931.1
Now is a great time for new religions to pop up. There are people
who get religious about jogging, they get religious about sex....
Health foods have become the basis of a religion. ESP, of course,
flying saucers, anything is fertile ground now. There's a new mes-
siah born every day.
Tom Wolfe, 1980.2
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." 3 Although the Supreme Court has discussed the
concept of "religion" in several cases, 4 it has not provided a specific
definition to govern cases arising under the religion clauses. Most
courts have approached the question with caution, recognizing that
a very rigid judicial definition of religion would implicate the con-
cerns underlying the religion causes. 5 Indeed, one commentator
has argued that any judicial definition of religion would violate both
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause. 6 Nonetheless,
the constitutional command that the government neither promote
religion, nor restrain religious liberty, requires an interpretation of
the word "religion."
This Note attempts to provide a definition of religion that is
generally consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as well as the
Court's discussions of the religion clauses, and that will advance the
purposes of the religion clauses in both free exercise cases and es-
tablishment clause cases. Part I establishes criteria for a constitu-
tional definition of religion in light of the purposes of the religion
1 United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
2 TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE: WHAT A LONG STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN (J.S.
Wenner ed. 1987).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 See infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("The determination
of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate
task .. ").
6 See Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" In the Law, 73 YALE LJ. 593
(1964). The author argues that "any definition of religion would seem to violate reli-
gious freedom in that it would dictate to religions, present and future, what they must
be.... Furthermore, an attempt to define religion... would run afoul of the 'establish-
ment' clause .... Id. at 604.
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clauses and the Supreme Court's general approach to the religion
clauses. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court's discussions of the
meaning of religion. Part III surveys several approaches to the con-
cept of religion and assesses them in light of the criteria outlined in
Part I. Part IV sets forth a proposed definition of religion. Finally,
Part V raises several possible objections to this proposal and seeks
to defend the proposed definition.
I
THE NEED FOR A UNITARY, FLEXIBLE DEFINITION OF
RELIGION
A. The Need For A Specific Definition
Although it has been argued that the courts should, and indeed
must avoid defining religion, 7 the plain language of the religion
clauses suggests the need for a definition that is specific enough to
allow courts to distinguish religious belief or activity from nonreli-
gious belief or activity.8 Moreover, the Court's modern interpreta-
tion of the free exercise clause makes this task unavoidable. Under
this interpretation, the free exercise clause, under certain circum-
stances, entitles persons to an exemption from secular government
regulation, where the regulation interferes with a person's religious
practices or beliefs. 9 Assessing such free exercise claims requires a
definition that is specific enough to enable courts to distinguish be-
tween religious beliefs or practices and nonreligious beliefs or
practices. 0
B. A Definition Broad Enough to Account for the Growing
Diversity of Religious Belief
The general function of the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment is to guarantee religious liberty. As Justice Goldberg has
stated:
These two proscriptions are to be read together and in light of the
single end which they are designed to serve. [This] basic purpose
... is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious
liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which
secure the best hope of attainment of that end.''
7 See supra note 6.
8 As one commentator put it, "avoiding the task [of defining religion] would seem
to violate the principles underlying the [free exercise] clause." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-6, at 1179 (2d ed. 1988).
S) See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
10 See generally Choper, Defining "'Religion - in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 587.
I I Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg,J., con-
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This raises the difficult question of what the concept of "reli-
gious liberty" entails. Although the framers probably conceived of
religion in a theistic manner, 1 2 it is not at all clear that they intended
the religion clauses to apply only to theistic religions.' 3 Moreover,
the broad purpose of the religion clauses was not merely to assure
the liberty of particular religious denominations, but rather to pro-
tect the religious impulses of man from government interference.
This purpose is recognized in several Supreme Court opinions. For
example, Justice Brennan has observed:
The constitutional mandate expresses a deliberate and considered
judgment that [religious] matters are to be left to the conscience
of the citizen and declares as a basic postulate of the relation be-
tween the citizen and his government that "the rights of con-
science are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear
the gentlest touch of governmental hand .... 14
Once we recognize that the concept of religious liberty entails
protecting matters of conscience from government interference, it
becomes clear that a constitutional definition of religion cannot be
limited to the theistic religions recognized by the Framers, or even
to a broader class of traditional religions. Such a rigid definition of
curring). See also Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 810 (1978) ("If there is any
single unifying principle underlying the two religion clauses ...it is that individual
choice in matters of religion should be free.") (footnote omitted).
12 See Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
757-58 (1984); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1060 n.26 (1978) [hereinafter Definition of Religion]. James Madison viewed religion as
"the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (quoting Madison, Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-
91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
13 See Definition of Religion, supra note 12, at 1060. Thomas Jefferson apparently en-
visioned religious liberty for various faiths. He stated that his Virginia Act for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom "was meant to be universal ... to comprehend within the mantle
of its protection the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mohometan, the Hindu, and infidel of
every denomination." Id. at 1060 n.27.
14 Schenipp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Representative
Daniel Carroll of Maryland, speaking during debate upon the proposed Bill of Rights,
August 15, 1789). See also id. at 217-18 ("Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere
to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot
be restricted by law.") (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 319 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940));
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971) (referring to "the general proposition
that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override
the demands of the secular state."). Most commentators have also recognized this fun-
damental principle. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-3, at 1160 ("The free exercise
clause was at the very least designed to guarantee freedom of conscience by preventing
any degree of compulsion in matters of belief.") (citations omitted); Clark, Guidelines for
the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 340 (1969) (arguing "that the principal
interest protected by the free exercise clause is the individual's interest in not being
forced to violate the compelling requirements of conscience").
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religion would be inconsistent with the very concept of religious lib-
erty.' 5 Accordingly, any proposed constitutional definition should
be broad and flexible enough to include changing concepts of reli-
gion, thereby protecting new and unorthodox religious beliefs.
C. A Unitary Definition
Several commentators have argued that in order to provide
broad protection under the free exercise clause for the growing di-
versity of faiths in the United States, without subjecting all govern-
ment humanitarian programs and activities to establishment clause
challenge, "religion" should be defined broadly for free exercise
purposes, but narrowly for establishment purposes. For example,
Professor Tribe advocated such a dual approach in the first edition
of his constitutional law treatise. While arguing for an expansive
free exercise definition, Tribe argued that "a less expansive notion
of religion was required for establishment clause purposes lest all
'humane' programs of government be deemed constitutionally sus-
pect." 6 In addition to this scholarly support, the dual approach has
gained some judicial support. 17
The dual approach presents two major difficulties. First, it is
inconsistent with the language and structure of the First Amend-
ment. Justice Rutledge's comments, in a dissenting opinion, illus-
trate this point:
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word
governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not
have two meanings, one narrow to forbid "an establishment," and
another, much broader, for securing "the free exercise thereof."
"Thereof" brings down "religion" with its entire and exact con-
tent, no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty
so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted con-
cerning the one as they are regarding the other.' 8
The second problem with a dual approach is that it may result
15 See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 14-6, at 1180 ("The idea of religious liberty-com-
bined with the special place of religion in the constitutional order-demands a definition
of 'religion' that goes beyond the closely bounded limits of theism, and accounts for the
multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate religious exercise.") (citation omitted).
16 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 (1st ed. 1978). Tribe claimed
that anything "arguably religious" should count as religious for free exercise purposes,
and that anything "arguably nonreligious" should count as nonreligious for establish-
ment purposes. Id. at 828. See also Definition of Religion, supra note 10, at 1084 (advocat-
ing use of a "bifurcated definition").
17 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1985); Sheldon v.
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963) ("religion" in the establishment clause
looks to majority's concept, while "religion" in the free exercise clause looks to the
minority's concept).
18 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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in discriminatory treatment among religions. For example, a dual
definition may provide more obscure religions and religious activi-
ties with special treatment, by protecting the free exercise of such
religions, without placing any establishment clause limits on the
government's ability to promote and aid such religions. 19
A dual approach might bejustified in spite of these problems, if
it were necessary to reconcile the two religion clauses. However,
the conflict does not appear as great as Tribe originally thought.
Indeed, Tribe has now rejected the dual approach, stating that it
"constitutes a dubious solution to a problem that, on closer inspec-
tion, may not exist at all." 20 The establishment clause prohibits
government action taken for the sole purpose of advancing religion,
or having primarily religious effects, or creating excessive entangle-
ment with religion.2 1 It does not, however, prevent the government
from taking any action that is consistent with a particular religion or
religious tenet.2 2 Thus, just as a prohibition on murder is not an
establishment of religion merely because it corresponds to one of
the Ten Commandments, federal laws promoting equality of oppor-
tunity23 are not establishments of religion, even though a commit-
ment to equality may be a religious command for some.
D. Criteria for a Constitutional Definition of Religion
In light of the preceding discussion, a constitutional definition
of religion should meet three main criteria, in addition to the crite-
rion of general compatibility with approaches suggested by the
Supreme Court. First, it should be specific enough to circumscribe
the concept of religion, and allow courts to distinguish nonreligious
from religious beliefs. Second, it should be flexible enough to em-
brace new and unorthodox forms of religion. Third, it should be
applicable to both free exercise clause cases and establishment
clause cases.
II
SUPREME COURT APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF
RELIGION
The early Supreme Court pronouncements on the meaning of
religion generally defined religion very narrowly in terms of a God
19 See generally Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring); Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 814.
20 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 14-6, at 187.
21 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
22 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("[T]he Establishment
Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.").
23 E.g., Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
536 [Vol. 74:532
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or Creator. For example, in 1890 the Court stated that "[t]he term
'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will."' 24 In 1961, however, in Tor-
caso v. Watkins,25 the Supreme Court abandoned the use of a belief
in God as the touchstone for religious belief, when it invalidated a
Maryland law which required all public office holders to declare a
belief in the existence of God.26 The Court stated that the govern-
ment may not "aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." 27
The Court has provided its most extensive discussions of the
meaning of religion in cases interpreting the conscientious objector
exemption from the selective service. In United States v. Seeger,28 the
Court interpreted the Universal Military Training and Service Act
which exempted from combat persons who objected to participation
"by reason of religious training and belief."29 The Act defined
"religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but [excluding] essentially political, sociologi-
cal or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."30 De-
spite Congress' apparent intent to limit the exemption to objections
based on traditional religious beliefs, 31 the Court held that this defi-
nition applied to Seeger who had stated that "he preferred to leave
the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open," and that his
objection was based on a "belief in and devotion to goodness and
virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed."' 32 The Court ruled that "Congress, in using the expression
24 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). See also United States v. Maclntosh,
283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, CJ., dissenting) ("the essence of religion is belief
in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation").
25 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
26 The Court previously had suggested a less rigid approach to the concept of reli-
gion, in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), when it observed that "freedom of
religious belief... embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths." Id. at 86-87.
27 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495. The Court then noted that "among religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Id. at
495 n.l 1.
28 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
29 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958).
30 Id.
31 See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 759-60. Noting that "Congress had adopted
this definition after a dispute in the courts of appeals over how broadly religion should
be understood," Professor Greenawalt concludes that "the statutory language rather
clearly represented endorsement of a traditional theistic conception of religion." Id.
32 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
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'Supreme Being' rather than the designation 'God,' was merely clar-
ifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace
all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or phil-
osophical views." 33 The Court then held that the test for "belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being is whether a given belief that is sin-
cere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its pocessor par-
allel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption."'34
Although the Court in Seeger was attempting to define religious
belief within the meaning of a statute, rather than within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment, its decision was clearly influenced by
constitutional considerations. These considerations are evident in
the Court's statement that "[tlhis construction avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others . . . . "35 Since a conscientious objector
statute distinguishing between different religious beliefs protected
by the First Amendment would raise potential establishment clause
problems, 36 as well as potential free exercise clause problems, 37 the
Seeger Court may have viewed its broad interpretation as necessary
to avoid finding the statute unconstitutional, 38 or at least as neces-
sary to avoid a difficult constitutional question. Moreover, courts
33 Id. at 165.
34 Id. at 165-66. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), a plurality of the
Court extended Seeger and ruled that:
if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical
or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place paral-
lel to that filled by God" in traditionally religious persons.
Id. at 340.
35 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
36 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The [establishment
clause] means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can ... prefer
one religion over another.").
37 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that under a more
narrow interpretation than the Court's "those who embraced one religious faith rather
than another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination . . . would
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment"). See also Rabin, When is a
Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
231, 241 (1966) (arguing that "constitutional considerations.., led the [Seeger] Court to
construe the statute in the chosen manner.").
38 But cf Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), in which the Court held that
the Congressional decision to protect religious objection to all wars, but not religious
objection to a particular war, violated neither the establishment clause nor the free exer-
cise clause. Regarding the establishment clause challenge, the Court found the distinc-
tion justified by secular pragmatic considerations, such as "the hopelessness of
converting a sincere conscientious objector [apparently meaning an objector to all wars]
into an effective fighting man." Id. at 453. As for the free exercise claim, the Court,
stated that "[t]he incidental burdens felt by [the claimants] are strictly justified by sub-
stantial government interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned." Id. at
[Vol. 74:532
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and commentators have generally interpreted Seeger as signaling a
broad concept of religion for First Amendment purposes. 39
The Court's opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 however, suggests a
much more narrow conception of religion. In Yoder, the Court held
that a group of Amish plaintiffs, who claimed that the state's re-
quirement of compulsory education beyond the eighth grade vio-
lated their religion, were entitled to a religious exemption. After
observing that "to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief," the Court emphasized the
religious nature of the Amish beliefs, by contrasting these beliefs
with philosophical beliefs:
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values ac-
cepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social val-
ues of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philo-
sophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does
not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.4 1
Although this passage seems to cast doubt on the viability of
the Seeger approach as a constitutional test for religion,42 it is unclear
how much weight Yoder carries in determining the scope of "reli-
gion." Since the state did not dispute the religious nature of the
Amish practices, 43 the definition of religion was not at issue, and the
preceding statement was dicta. As a result, Yoder should not neces-
sarily be read as a rejection of the Seeger approach in constitutional
cases.
44
463. The Court left open the question of whether the free exercise clause "would re-
quire exemption of any class other than objectors to particular wars." Id. at 461 n.23.
39 See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
Relying on Seeger, Judge Adams concludes that "the modern approach looks to the famil-
iar religions as models in order to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas
or beliefs is confronting the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as unques-
tioned and accepted 'religions.' " Id. at 207. See also Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d
1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981); Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 760-61 ("the Supreme Court's
broad statutory construction of religion [in Seeger and IWelsh] ... has led other courts and
scholars to assume that the constitutional definition of religion is now much more exten-
sive than it once appeared to be").
40 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41 Id. at 216.
42 In his opinion, dissenting in part, Justice Douglas criticized this passage as a re-
treat from Seeger. Id. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
43 406 U.S. at 219.
44 See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 759 ("[Tlhe Court did in [Yoder] distinguish
religious belief from subjective rejection of secular values, but its opinion does not illu-
minate the lines between religions and nonreligions and is colored by the specific free
exercise context of the case. I do not take the passage as representing any retreat from
Torcaso."). See also Definition of Religion, supra note 12, at 1066 n.63, which states that
"[t]here is no evidence that the Supreme Court has retreated from Seeger-11'elsh in recent
1989] 539
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III
SOME APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM AND CRITICISMS
A. The Ultimate Concern Approach
In Seeger, the Court relied on the writings of the theologian,
Paul Tillach, who argues that God is, for each individual, the source
of that individual's "ultimate concern," and "what [one] take[s] seri-
ously without any reservation."'4 5 One student commentator has ar-
gued that this concept of ultimate concern should be the sole
criterion for religion under the free exercise clause. 46 The Note ar-
gues that ultimate concern represents "the essence of religion."'47 It
then explains that " 'concern' denotes the affective or motivational
aspect of human experience; the word 'ultimate' signifies that the
concern must be of an unconditional, absolute, or unqualified char-
acter."'48 Under this view, whatever an individual regards as his ulti-
mate concern, "[e]ven political and social beliefs,"'49 is his religion.
At least in theory, the ultimate concern approach has a number
of advantages. By not specifying the content of religious belief,
either in terms of the types of questions that religion must address,
or the types of answers it must produce, the approach avoids any
risk of "religious chauvinism" and ensures tolerance for changing
concepts of religion. 50 Moreover, as the Note observes, "what con-
cerns could be more deserving of preferred status than those
deemed by the individual to be ultimate?" 5 1 Finally, since ultimate
concerns involve beliefs that "cannot be superseded," 52 protecting
such concerns from government interference would seem to ad-
vance the free exercise goal of not subjecting persons to the "hard
years." The author argues that the Court's discussion in Yoder was simply intended to
emphasize that the Amish were "at the core of even a narrow understanding of reli-
gion." Id. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 14-6, at 1183 ("Although ... a broad [func-
tional] definition is arguably consistent with the Court's statutory interpretation in the
conscientious objector cases, it clashes directly with the constitutional holding in Wiscon-
sin v. 1oder.") (citation omitted); Choper, supra note 10, at 589 ("the Seeger definition's
promise for attaining constitutional status has been measurably diminished by the
Court's subsequent treatment of the problem in Sherbert and Yoder").
45 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187 (quoting, P. TILLICH, THE SHARING OF THE FOUNDATIONS
57 (1948)).
46 See Definition of Religion, supra note 12. The author would not apply the ultimate
concern definition to establishment clause cases, because such an approach "might lead
some to conclude that numerous humanitarian government programs should be re-
garded as unconstitutional." Id. at 1084. Accordingly, the author offers a separate defi-
nition for purposes of the establishment clause. See id. 1086-89. For criticism of such a
dual approach to the definition of religion, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
47 Definition of Religion, supra 12, at 1066.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1071.
50 See id. at 1070, 1076-77.
51 Id. at 1075.
52 Id. at 1075 n.108.
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choice between contravening imperatives of religion and conscience
or suffering penalties. '53
Despite these apparent advantages, it is not clear that the con-
cept of ultimate concern would, in practice, perform the function
that the Note envisions it performing. First, the ultimate concern
approach assumes that "the concerns of any individual can be
ranked" and each individual has a single highest concern that "gives
meaning and orientation to a person's whole life."' 54 However, indi-
viduals may have several ultimate concerns, none of which is supe-
rior to the rest. As Professor Greenawalt has noted, "[miany people
care a great deal about a number of things-their own happiness,
the welfare of their family, their country, perhaps their religion-
without any clear ordering among these . . . -55 Since the Note
assumes that each person has a personal-concern ranking system, it
does not explain how we are to determine the ultimate concern of a
person having several deep concerns.
A second practical difficulty with the ultimate concern approach
is that the concept of ultimate concern may not always coincide with
the types of concerns that the religion clauses are intended to pro-
tect. The Court has generally recognized that the religion clauses
protect persons from government interference with matters of con-
science. 56 The Harvard Note does not state that ultimate concern
always involves matters of conscience, but it does identify ultimate
concern as that which "happens 'in the center of the personal life
and includes all its elements.' "-57 And since the Note recognizes the
"mandate of inviolability of conscience"' , as central to the free ex-
ercise clause,-' it apparently assumes that ultimate concerns are al-
ways matters of conscience. However, Professor Greenawalt has
persuasively argued that what a person views as his ultimate con-
cern, he does not always view as a matter of conscience. For exam-
ple, "the lives of people addicted to drugs may center around using
and obtaining the drug, and they may be willing to do almost any-
thing rather than be deprived of the drug. Yet they may not regard
their obsession as one concerning conscience." 60
53 Gillette v. United States, 400 U.S. 437, 445 (1971).
54 Definition of Religion, supra note 12, at 1067.
55 Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 808.
56 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57 Definition of Religion, supra note 12, at 1076.
58 Id. at 1058.
59 See id. at 1058, 1074.
60 Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 808. This problem might be avoided by claiming
that implicit in the ultimate concern approach is that ultimate concerns are equivalent to
matters of conscience. Assuming this to be so, Greenawalt's criticism still suggests that
"ultimate concern" may be a poor choice of terminology and that a definition in terms
19891
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B. A Non-Rational, Transcendent Reality Approach
The concept of religion is often associated with questions fac-
ing mankind that are not subject to rational or scientific proof.61
This view of religion has led some commentators to suggest a defini-
tion of religious belief as "faith in something beyond the mundane
observable world-faith that some higher or deeper reality exists
than that which can be established by ordinary existence or scientific
observation."-62 A recent Washington Law Review Note advocates
this definition as a modified ultimate concern approach. 63 Under
this approach, religion is defined in terms of ultimate concern,
which is defined in terms of "questions which science cannot objec-
tively answer." 64  More specifically, the Note states that
" '[u]ltimate' refers to all values and 'knowledge' which cannot be
proven true, or even tested, by empirical evidence." 65
This approach presents two related difficulties. First, it seems
highly unlikely that an acceptable line could ever be drawn between
the realm of scientific demonstrability and the realm of faith. In-
deed, it may be persuasively argued that the validity of all claims to
scientific truth depend on a leap of faith in accepting the validity of
inductive reasoning.66 Moreover, even if we assume the validity of
inductive reasoning, "[n]ot every view is easily classifiable as one
that does or does not invoke higher reality since the edges of natural
social science, and of rational philosophy, are hardly sharp." 67
The second problem with the transcendent reality approach is
that even if courts could articulate a workable distinction between
those beliefs held on faith and those based on scientific proof, the
of duties of conscience would be more appropriate. See infra notes 134-37 and accompa-
nying text.
61 See, e.g., United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Religious
belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individ-
ual to his fellow-men and to his universe .... ).
62 Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 805. Although Greenawalt rejects the transcendent
reality approach, along with all other definitional approaches, (see infra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text) he claims that "of all the positions that assert some essential core to
the constitutional concept of religion, the claim that belief in higher reality constitutes
that core is by far the most tenable." Id. at 806.
63 Note, Secular Humanism and the Definition of Religion: Extending a Modified "Ultimate
Concern" Test to Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commis-
sioners, 63 WASH. L. REV. 445 (1988) [hereinafter Modified "Ultimate Concern "].
64 Id. at 457.
65 Id. at 456.
66 See D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 25-39 (L.A.
Silby-Bigge ed. 1893).
67 Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 805. See also Choper, supra note 10, at 603 ("When
justifying competing government policies on such varied matters as social welfare, the
economy, and military and foreign affairs, there is at bedrock only a gossamer line be-
tween 'rational' and 'supernatural' causation-the former really being little more capa-
ble of 'scientific proof' than the latter.").
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result would almost certainly be an unacceptably overbroad defini-
tion of religion. The ability of the government to take action pursu-
ant to particular values would be seriously threatened by an
approach that classified as inherently religious all views not subject
to scientific proof. For example, the teaching of shared societal val-
ues in schools would presumably violate the establishment clause.68
Furthermore, this approach, at least if strictly construed, would
seem to bring into question criminal prohibitions on murder and
other violent crimes, which are similarly based on shared societal
values.69
The Note claims that while the teaching of values would be pro-
hibited, teaching of science, such as evolution, would be permissi-
ble.70 However, even this is not clear under the transcendent
reality. For example, in Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution,7' the plain-
tiffs claimed that a Smithsonian exhibit, which allegedly "ex-
plain[ed] and advocat[ed] the theory of evolution," inhibited their
free exercise rights, and unconstitutionally established the religion
of Secular Humanism. 72 The plaintiffs argued that evolution is "a
nonobservable and alleged phenomenon which can neither be
proven nor verified by the scientific method" and, therefore, "is not
a true science, but is afaith position." 73 The court rejected the chal-
lenge, stating: "The fact that religions involve acceptance of some
tenets on faith without scientific proof obviously does not mean that
all beliefs and all theories which rest in whole or in part on faith are
therefore elements of religion as that term is used in the first
amendment." 74  Under the transcendent reality approach, the
evolution exhibit would be an establishment of religion, unless it
could be shown that evolution was subject to scientific proof. More-
over, even if such a showing could be made, the decision to advocate,
or even to research, a particular science, arguably reflects non-scien-
tific value judgments, and therefore, might still violate the establish-
ment clause, under this view. 75
68 See Modified "LUltimate Concern ", supra note 63, at 459 (Schools may not teach "un-
testable 'ultimate meanings' "), 455 ("Ethical and other value judgments do not have
rational grounds").
69 The Note seeks to avoid this difficulty by arguing that legislation designed to
advance the majority's non-rational, value-based ends is permissible, so long as the state
is not presenting the "majority values as morally superior to minority values." Id. at
461.
70 See id. at 459.
71 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
72 Id. at 740.
73 Id. at 742.
74 Id.
75 See Choper, supra note 10, at 603 ("[A]t the level of final decision, even the most
frankly utilitarian goals depend ultimately on values-such as good or evil, or even the
desirability of human survival-that represent normative preferences rather than ration-
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C. An Extratemporal Consequences Approach
In his article, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 76 Dean
Choper offers a definition of religion that focuses on whether the
allegedly religious belief involves "a belief in the phenomenon of
'extratemporal consequences.' "77 Under this view, a person's be-
liefs are religious, for First Amendment purposes, if "the effects of
action taken pursuant or contrary to the dictates of a person's be-
liefs extend in some meaningful way beyond his lifetime." 78 Ac-
cordingly, the free exercise clause provides protection from
government activity that forces a person to face the "cruel choice"
between "suffering meaningful temporal disabilities" for violating
the government's commands and suffering meaningful ex-
tratemporal consequences (or disabilities) for violating commands
of one's religion. 79 Choper acknowledges that his definition, like
other content-based definitions of religion, "presents the danger of
parochialism and intolerance-that judges will include conventional
orthodoxy in the definition and exclude new, unfamiliar, or 'danger-
ous' beliefs." He claims, however, that a definition which focuses on
"ultimate supposed effects of beliefs" rather than the substance of
the beliefs "is sufficiently flexible and capable of growth to include
newly perceived and unconventional values." 80
A definition that focuses on extratemporal effects has more or-
thodoxy built into it than Choper seems to recognize. The problem
is not so much that it will favor older religions and exclude newer
beliefs, but rather that it excludes all religions, new or old, that do
not involve an afterlife. 8' As a result, the free exercise clause would
provide no protection for religions that do not espouse belief in an
afterlife. 82 For example, the beliefs expressed by the persons seek-
ing conscientious objector status in Seeger would not be deemed reli-
ally compelled choices."). In criticizing the transcendent reality approach, I have fo-
cused on the establishment clause difficulties, because they are the most blatant.
However, similar overbreadth objections could be made in the free exercise area. In-
deed, almost any objection to a legal restriction or obligation could be characterized so
as to rest on a nonscientific value judgment.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 599.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 597-601.
80 Id. at 599.
81 In addition to excluding these religions altogether, the extratemporal conse-
quences approach would recognize the religious beliefs and practices of a religionist
who believes in an afterlife, only where the beliefs and practices directly related to the
afterlife. Thus, as Professor Greenawalt has observed, the "use of wine for communion"
would not be considered a religious practice. See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 803.
82 Ghoper acknowledges that beliefs "associated with the Universalist, Secular Hu-
manism, Deism and Ethical Culture movements" would fall outside his definition.
Choper, supra note 10, at 600.
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gious for First Amendment purposes because none of the claimants
in Seeger expressed a belief that participation in the war would sub-
ject them to eternal damnation or any other extratemporal conse-
quences.8 3 Under the extratemporal consequences approach, an
objection to military service that "is rooted in a deep-seated faith
that [to] voluntarily kill[] another human being [may determine
one's] destiny after death" would qualify as a religious objection.8 4
But this approach would not recognize the religious nature of objec-
tions based on a deep-seated faith in man's spiritual nature and a
belief that the "most important religious law [is] that no man ought
ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other
end,"'8 5 or based on "beliefs that taking another's life is a fundamen-
tal violation of 'God's law' but causes no afterlife effects."8 6
Choper defends this result by claiming that "the degree of in-
ternal trauma on earth for those who have put their souls in jeop-
ardy for eternity can be expected to be markedly greater" than for
those who have violated a religious command that does not affect
prospects for an after-life.8 7 However, the person forced to violate
deeply-held convictions of conscience may suffer severe trauma in
terms of guilt. It is hardly self-evident that the trauma of one fear-
ing extratemporal consequences is any more severe. Courts and
commentators generally recognize the severity of psychological
trauma associated with violating one's conscience without consider-
ing the effects of the violation.8 Distinguishing the trauma suffered
by one who violates a duty thought to have extratemporal conse-
quences, and that suffered by one who violates some other religious
duty, becomes even more difficult when we consider the wide variety
of views held by believers in an extratemporal world.89
Even if we assume that the religionist who believes his violation
will lead to extratemporal consequences will suffer greater trauma
83 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-69, 186-88 (1965).
84 Choper, supra note 10, at 598.
85 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 168.
86 See Choper, supra note 10, at 598 n. 1 0 9 .
87 Id. at 598. Choper refers to those who have violated dictates unrelated to an
afterlife, as "those who have only violated a moral scruple." Id. This description, how-
ever, begs the question by assuming that such dictates are only "moral scruples."
88 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 14, at 337 ("the cost to a principled individual of failing
to do his moral duty is generally severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of
moral self respect."). See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971) (refer-
ring to the "hard choice between contravening imperatives of religion and conscience or
suffering penalties"). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 804. Greenawalt concludes that
"[w]hen we recognize the wide range ofviews among persons whose beliefs include faith
in some life beyond this one, we will be hesitant to conclude that persons with such faith
will generally suffer more torment from violating conscience than will persons who think
they have done some terrible wrong in the only life they have to live." Id. at 804.
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for violating a religious duty than will one who violates his duty of
religion, but anticipates no such consequences, Choper's argument
remains unpersuasive. The problem is that the argument assumes
that the religionist will violate his religious beliefs, rather than the
government's command. If, instead, the religionist chooses to
disobey the government, then the nonextratemporal believer would
appear to face the greater trauma. As Choper notes, "at a psycho-
logical level, the identical cost may be more comfortably borne by
those religionists who can balance [the punishment suffered for vio-
lation of the government's command] against eternal rather than
temporal benefits. Indeed, some may believe that martyrdom has
independent value in affecting their destiny." 90 Thus, in some
cases, the government may be doing the afterlife believer a favor by
punishing him.
In response to this, Choper argues that "because the burden of
obeying the law is so severe for the religious objector [whose objec-
tion is based on extratemporal effects], our traditions hold that his
noncompliance is not as morally culpable as one [sic] who disobeys
for other reasons." 91 This explanation fails for two reasons. First,
Choper does not explain why we should focus on the burden of
obeying the law, rather than on the burden of disobeying the law, or
some combination of these two factors. Second, and perhaps more
important, it is not at all clear that the person who disobeys for fear
of eternal damnation is less morally culpable than the person who
disobeys because of his devotion to God's law, or his deep-seated
faith and "devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sake," or
his commitment to the "most important religious law ... that no
man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to
any other end." 92 Indeed, just the opposite would seem true. A
person who violates the law in the name of altruistic principles is
generally thought of as morally defensible, if not morally commend-
able. In contrast, a person who violates the law in pursuit of his own
self-interest, is generally thought of as the most condemnable
violator.93
D. A Non-Definitional Analogical Approach
In his article, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law,94 Profes-
sor Greenawalt rejects both the "ultimate concern" approach, 95 and
90 Choper, supra note 10, at 598.
91 Id.
92 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 168.
93 The extratemporal consequences approach also creates difficulties as applied to
the establishment clause. See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 804.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 806-11.
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the "extratemporal consequences" approach, 96 claiming that these
and other "dictionary approach[s] are wholly inadequate to produce
acceptable results in a wide range of religion clause cases." 97 Argu-
ing that "any dictionary approach oversimplifies the concept of reli-
gion," 98 Greenawalt proposes that "religion should be determined
by the closeness of analogy in the relevant respects between the dis-
puted instance and what is indisputably religion." 99
Analogizing to other religions is by no means a unique ap-
proach. Any approach to religion must begin with a focus on what
are the usual features of recognized religions.' 0 0 For example, a fo-
cus on ultimate concern reflects the fact that religions traditionally
have dealt with questions of ultimate concern.' 0 ' Similarly, a focus
on extratemporal consequences reflects the fact that most tradi-
tional religions include strong beliefs regarding extratemporal con-
sequences.' 0 2 Indeed, Greenawalt recognizes that the distinctive
feature about his approach is not its use of analogical reasoning, but
that "it denies that a search for essential conditions is a profitable
method for applying the concept of religion."' 03
This denial results in an approach that provides little guidance
in determining what qualifies as a religion. While Greenawalt sug-
gests several "indubitably religious" attributes,' 0 4 he does not indi-
cate how many of, or what combination of, these attributes must be
present to satisfy the constitutional concept of religion. As a result,
the approach presents problems of potential overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness.
By failing to identify any necessary condition for religion, the
96 See id. at 803-04.
97 Id. at 765.
98 Id. at 763.
99 Id. at 764.
100 In this sense my proposal also represents an analogical approach. See infra notes
130-34 and accompanying text. It differs from Greenawalt's approach, however, in that
it seeks to identify the essential features of commonly recognized religions.
101 See Definition of Religion, supra note 12, at 1067 n.68 (suggesting the concept of
"God" for traditional religions is equivalent to ultimate concern).
102 See Choper, supra note 10, at 600 (claiming that Christianity, Islam, most
branches of Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism all teach a belief in some form of
afterlife).
103 Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 766.
104 These include:
a belief in God; a comprehensive view of the world and human purposes;
a belief in some form of afterlife; communication with God through ritual
acts of worship and through corporate and individual prayer; a particular
perspective on moral obligations derived from a moral code or from a
conception of God's nature; practices involving repentance and forgive-
ness of sins; "religious" feelings of awe, guilt, and adoration; the use of
sacred texts; and organization to facilitate the corporate aspects of reli-
gious practice and to promote and perpetuate beliefs and practices.
Id. at 767-68.
1989] 547
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
analogical approach, if interpreted broadly, presents the risk that
organizations or belief systems, which are loosely analogous to pre-
viously identified religions, but generally not considered to be reli-
gious (even by their followers), will be defined as religion under the
First Amendment. The approach does not explain, for example,
whether a political philosophy such as Marxism, which has some of
the religious attributes set forth by Greenawalt, would qualify as a
religion. 0 5 Greenawalt indicates that Marxism "is usually not con-
sidered religious," 10 6 but he does not explain how one would reach
this conclusion relying solely on his analogical approach.
Conversely, by failing to identify any sufficient condition for
religion, the analogical approach is subject to a narrow interpreta-
tion that might exclude new and different religions. For example,
any emphasis on the structural features of organized religion 10 7
would result in the exclusion of very personal approaches to reli-
gion that do not conform to any particular group or organization.10 8
Such a result would be inconsistent with the concept of religious
liberty. 109
One might argue that to criticize the analogical approach for
failing to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for whether
something is religion misses the point of the approach. After all,
Greenawalt's position is that any test based on essential conditions
or on a set definition, even if desirable, is unworkable for purposes
of the religion clauses. 1 0 Greenawalt, however, is incorrect in his
perception that a definition providing essential features of religion
will necessarily oversimplify the concept of religion. I will argue
that the definition outlined below, which provides the necessary and
sufficient conditions for religion, does provide a workable approach
to the religion clauses,II
E. An Analogical Approach Based on External Manifestations
of Traditional Religions
Another possible method of definition by analogy would be to
105 Marxism does present "a comprehensive view of the world and human pur-
poses," it has "a particular perspective on moral obligations derived from a moral code
... '" it arguably makes "use of sacred texts," and at least in some modern manifesta-
tions, it has an "organization to facilitate the corporate aspects of [its] practices and to
promote and perpetuate beliefs and practices."
106 Greenawalt, supra note 21, at 768.
107 In terms of Greenawalt's suggested attributes of religion, structural features
would include those features related to "corporate aspects of religious practice," and in
some cases "the use of sacred texts." See supra note 104.
108 See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
10 ) See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
I 0 See supra notes 97-98, 103 and accompanying text.
III See infra notes 13 1-56 and accompanying text.
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focus on the external manifestations that are generally associated
with traditional religions. For example, Judge Adams of the Third
Circuit has proposed a test for religion consisting of three indicia,
the third of which is the presence of "any formal, external, or sur-
face signs that may be analogized to accepted religions."' 12 Among
the external signs that might be considered in determining whether
a belief or practice is part of a religion are, "formal services, cere-
monial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organiza-
tion, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other
similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions."' 13
The primary advantage of such an approach is that it provides more
objective and tangible elements for courts to focus on in assessing
whether a belief or practice is religious.
However, any approach that focuses on such external indicia
favors organized religion over individualized personal approaches
to religion. Thus, it would threaten to exclude religious beliefs that
are not held by any group or sect. For example, the religious beliefs
asserted in Seeger did not involve any organizational or formal trap-
pings. 114 Bowen v. Roy115 presents another example. In that case,
Roy asserted a religious belief that the use of a Social Security
number for his daughter would "rob [her] spirit.., and prevent her
from attaining greater spiritual power."" 6 Although the belief was
based on conversations with a tribal chief,1 7 Roy's testimony indi-
cated that this was a personal religious belief, rather than one asso-
ciated with any organized formal group.' 18 Under an approach that
focuses on external manifestations of religion, these beliefs might
be considered nonreligious simply because they were privately held
by individuals, rather than by a formal group or organization.
Moreover, an undue focus on organizational elements might
exclude religious beliefs of a member of one sect where they conflict
with the views of other members of the sect. The Supreme Court
recognized this problem in Thomas v. Review Board." 19 In Thomas, the
112 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). The
first two parts ofJudge Adams' test are discussed in Part IV. See infra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
113 Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams' test does not
make these signs necessary conditions for religion, but suggests that in light of the
Court's dicta in Yoder (see supra note 41 and accompanying text), "formal and organiza-
tional signs may prove to be more important in defining religion than the conscientious
objector cases would suggest." Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 n.43 (Adams, J., concurring).
114 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-69, 186-88 (1965).
115 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
116 Id. at 2150.
117 Id.
118 See id. at 2150 n.3.
1'9 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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Court rejected the Indiana Supreme Court's suggestion that ajeho-
vah's Witness' refusal to participate in the production of war materi-
als was based on personal, rather than religious beliefs. 120
Observing that the Indiana court improperly gave "significant
weight to the fact that another Jehovah's Witness had no scruples
about working on tank turrets," the Court held that "the guarantee
of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all the
members of a religious sect." 121 The Court also criticized the Indi-
ana Supreme Court for relying on "the facts that Thomas was
'struggling' with his belief and that he was not able to 'articulate' his
belief precisely."' 22 The Court added that "courts should not un-
dertate to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that
he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not ar-
ticulated with ... clarity and precision . "... ,123
These examples suggest that any definition that focuses on ex-
ternal signs of traditional religions would recognize the beliefs and
practices of institutions as religious more easily than it would recog-
nize the beliefs of individuals as religious. This would be inconsis-
tent with the role of the Bill of Rights to protect the liberty of
individuals. As Professor Tribe has argued, definitions which "focus
on the externalities of a belief system or organization . . . unduly
constrain the concept of religion."' 124 Accordingly, courts cannot
properly rely on externalities, such as "the belief system's age, its
apparent social value, its political elements, the number of its adher-
ents, the sorts of demands it places on those adherents, the consis-
tency of practice among different adherents, and the system's
outward trappings-e.g., prayers, holy writings, and hierarchical or-
ganizational structures."' 125
That external manifestations should not be relied on in deter-
mining whether something is a religion does not mean they are ir-
relevant to First Amendment analysis. To be entitled to free
exercise protection, a claimant must demonstrate the sincerity of his
alleged religious beliefs. 126 The fact that a claimant can show that
120 See id. at 714-16.
121 Id. at 715-16.
122 Id. at 715. See also In ReJenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (vacating for reconsidera-
tion in light of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)) (see infra note 152 and accompa-
nying text), a Minnesota judgment denying exemption for woman opposed to jury duty
based on her own (apparently unique) interpretation of the Bible). Cf Hobie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm., 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1987) (holding recently adopted reli-
gious beliefs are entitled to full free exercise protection).
123 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
124 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 14-6, at 1181.
125 Id. at § 14-6, at 1181-82 (citations omitted).
126 See id. at § 14-12, at 1242 ("In order to gain the exemption, the claimant must
show... a sincerely held religious belief"). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
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he has consistently taken part in the ceremonial aspects of an organ-
ized religion will certainly be probative as to the sincerity of his be-
liefs. Nonetheless, the absence of any ceremonial aspects connected
with a claimant's asserted religious belief should not have any bear-
ing on whether the belief qualifies as religious. 127
IV
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION
A. Seeger: A Definition Based on the Role or Function That
Recognized Religions Have in the Life of the Adherents
The very concept of religious liberty suggests the inappropri-
ateness of an overly content-based definition. 28 In order to em-
)race new forms of religion, religion should be defined in a flexible
manner that reflects the general purposes of religious liberty rather
than the specific practices or beliefs of traditional religions. An ap-
proach that focuses on the function of religion in the adherent's life
performs this task far better than an approach that focuses on the
more tangible physical manifestations of religion. The Supreme
Court offered the bare skeleton of such a functional approach in
United States v. Seeger.t 29
In Seeger, the Court held that to qualify for a military service
exemption under a statute that required a "belief in relation to a
Supreme Being," a claimant must have a "belief that is sincere and
meaningful [and] occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly quali-
fies for the exemption."' 30 This definition focuses on the function
of belief in God in the life of a traditional religionist. Since the First
Amendment protects religious belief rather than "belief in relation
to a Supreme Being," the focus should be on the function of reli-
gious belief, rather than the function of belief in God. Accordingly,
applying the functional approach to the religion clauses, religion
might be defined as a set of beliefs that occupies a place in the life of
its possessor parallel to that filled by the religious beliefs of an ad-
235 (1972) ("the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of
their religious belief"); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981) (in a
free exercise case, "[a] court's task is to decide whether the beliefs avowed are ... sin-
cerely held").
127 Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1182 ("To be sure, courts should be wary of sudden
births of religions that entitle practitioners to special rights or exemptions. But the
proper place for that inquiry is in the assessment of the believer's sincerity, not in any
evaluation of the belief's externalities.").
128 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
129 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Seeger is discussed more fully supra notes 28-39 and accom-
panying text.
13o Id. at 166.
1989]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
herent to something that would clearly qualify as a religion within
the meaning of the First Amendment.' 3 1 However, without an ex-
planation as to what role religious belief usually plays for the fol-
lower of a recognized religion, this definition provides little
guidance. 32 The next section will attempt to remedy this by pro-
viding content to the function of religion in individual's lives.
B. The Religious Function: Addressing The Fundamental
Questions of Human Existence and Providing A Guide for
Conducting One's Life
Although Seeger did not spell out what role religion plays in the
life of a traditional religionist, several opinions of the circuit courts
shed light on this issue. The most complete discussions of the spe-
cific content of Seeger's functional approach have appeared in two
opinions by Judge Adams of the Third Circuit. The first of these
was a concurring opinion in Malnak v. Yogi,' 33 a case holding that
the teaching of Science of Creative Intelligence-Transcendental
Meditation in the public schools violates the establishment clause.
Explaining his "definition by analogy,"' 134 Judge Adams has identi-
fied the role of religion in the life of the religionist, as providing a
comprehensive belief system that "addresses fundamental and ulti-
mate questions having to do with deep and imponderable mat-
ters. '"1 3- Such fundamental questions include "the meaning of life
and death, man's role in the Universe, [and] the proper moral code
of right and wrong."' 13 6
131 Although strictly speaking, Seeger was a case of statutory interpretation, courts
and commentators have commonly used it as a guide to approaching issues raised under
the religion clauses. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
132 See Choper, supra note 10, at 593 ("One major ambiguity of the Seeger-JWVelsh for-
mulation concerns what 'place' religion occupies in the life of a member of a conven-
tional religious sect.").
133 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
134 Id. at 207 (Adams, J., concurring).
135 Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Malnak, 592
F.2d at 208-09 (Adams, J., concurring). In these opinions, Judge Adams proposes a test
for religion consisting of three indicia:
First a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to
do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is compre-
hensive in nature; it consists of a belief system as opposed to an isolated
teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of
certain formal and external signs.
Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. See also Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207-09. The third element is dis-
cussed supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
136 Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring); see also Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033
("Traditional religions consider and attempt to come to terms with what could best be
described as 'ultimate' questions-questions having to do with, among other things, life
and death, right and wrong, and good and evil."); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (characterizing recognized religions
as having "underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe").
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The requirement of a comprehensive belief system addressing
fundamental questions provides a good first criterion for the con-
cept of religion. Taken alone, however, it fails to capture the gener-
ally accepted notion of religion as giving rise to duties of
conscience. This notion is captured in the language of the conscien-
tious objector statute which refers to belief "involving duties supe-
rior to those arising from any human relation."' 37 The fact that
religion generally involves a compelling sense of devotion and duty
helps explain why the First Amendment singles out the practice of
religion for special constitutional protection. 138 As one commenta-
tor has noted, this sense of a duty provides a "forceful explanation
[and] justification for the free exercise clause" in that it is "particu-
larly cruel for the government to require the believer to choose be-
tween violating [the commands of religious belief] and suffering
meaningful temporal disabilities."'' 3 9 Moreover, the general under-
standing of the religion clauses as serving to protect the sanctity of
conscience reflects this view of religion.140
Supplementing Judge Adams' idea of a comprehensive belief
system that addresses fundamental questions with the notion of du-
ties of conscience provides a workable definition of religion for pur-
poses of the First Amendment. Taking these two ideas together,
religion can be defined as a comprehensive belief system that ad-
dresses the fundamental questions of human existence, such as the
meaning of life and death, man's role in the universe, and the nature
of good and evil, and that gives rise to duties of conscience. The
following section suggests a number of possible objections to this
definition and attempts to justify the definition by providing re-
sponses to these objections.
V
IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
A. Underinclusiveness
One possible criticism of the proposed definition is that it will
exclude certain recognized religious beliefs. For example, Dean
137 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. See also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-
34 (1931) (Hughes, CJ., dissenting) ("belief in a relation to God involving duties supe-
rior to those arising from any human relation").
138 James Madison's definition of religion suggests the importance of religious duty.
Madison viewed religion as "the duty which we owe to our Creator." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Madison, supra
note 12, at 183-91).
139 Choper, supra note 10, at 597.
140 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Arguably, this notion of duties of con-
science is implicit in Judge Adams' identification of "the proper moral code of right and
wrong," Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208, as one of the fundamental questions.
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Choper argues that a definition focusing on a comprehensive belief
system that addresses fundamental questions creates problems of
underinclusiveness. He claims that the difficulty "is that at least
some traditional religious beliefs would not appear necessarily to be
comprehensive." 1 4 '
The claim that not all religious beliefs are comprehensive seems
to misunderstand the approach. The comprehensiveness require-
ment does not mean that each religious belief or practice must be
"comprehensive." Rather, it simply recognizes that religions are
"not generally confined to one question or moral teaching."' 42
Similarly, the fundamental question requirement does not mean
that each belief or practice must address or directly relate to a fun-
damental question to be considered religious. 143 The belief or prac-
tice need only be a part of a belief system that addresses
fundamental question. 144 Thus, a practice such as the use of wine
for communion, which does not necessarily have any comprehensive
relation to fundamental questions, but is an integral part of a system
meeting the criteria for religion, would be recognized as a religious
practice.
B. Overinclusiveness
Dean Choper also argues that "many comprehensive beliefs are
not necessarily religious." 45 He illustrates his overinclusiveness ar-
gument by suggesting that "atheistic Marxism may be fairly de-
scribed as comprehensive because it supplies answers to profound
questions and denies the significance of other issues."' 46 One
might apply this overinclusiveness objection to the proposed ap-
proach, by further claiming that a philosophy such as Marxism gives
rise to duties of conscience in its adherents.
Although Marxism and other comprehensive political philoso-
141 Choper, supra note 10, at 596 n.104.
142 Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring).
143 This may be Choper's real concern, as he seems to equate the comprehensive
element with the fundamental question element. See Choper, supra note 10, at 596 n.104
("Marxism may fairly be described as comprehensive because it supplies answers to
profound questions") (emphasis added).
144 See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 197. Judge Adams stated:
It should not be reasoned that those teachings of accepted religious
groups that do not address "ultimate" matters are not entitled to reli-
gious status.... Once a belief-system has been credited as a "religion"
through an examination of its "ultimate" nature, its teachings on other
matters must also be accepted as religious.
Id. at 208-09 n.40 (Adams, J., concurring).
145 Choper, supra note 10, at 596 n.104.
146 Id. at 596-97 n. 104. See also L. TgIBE, supra note 8, § 14-6, at 1182-83 ("A gener-
ous functional definition would seem to classify any deep-rooted philosophy as religion,
Marxism as well as Methodism.").
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phies may indeed address profound questions, it is not clear that
they address fundamental questions as defined in the proposed defi-
nition.' 47 Their concerns tend to be more mundane than the funda-
mental questions suggested above. For example, rather than
addressing "man's role in the universe," most political philosophies
address man's role in some political community, such as a city-state,
a nation-state, or under a "dictatorship of the proletariat."' 48 More-
over, with the possible exception of natural law theories, political
philosophies do not usually address the nature of good and evil in
a normative sense; they generally attempt to define "good" in
a descriptive sense, and then advocate means to obtaining that good
or goods. 149 And few, if any, political philosophies, Marxism in-
cluded, attempt to explain the meaning of life and death. Thus,
even focusing solely on the first criterion of the fundamental ques-
tion/duties of conscience approach, the approach does not appear
overinclusive.
When we consider the second requirement of the proposed ap-
proach, that the belief system give rise to duties of conscience,
strictly political philosophies are even more removed from the defi-
nition. Although political philosophies generally provide guides to
action, these guides, for most people, are better characterized as
prudential maxims, than duties of conscience. A duty of conscience
serves as an end in itself, which cannot be compromised to serve
some more mundane duty (such as the duty to obey the law). A duty
arising from one's political philosophy generally serves as a means
to some other end, and lacks the compelling nature of a duty of
conscience. For example, persons who believe strongly in democ-
racy may feel a duty to vote, but few would view this duty as too
compelling to be outweighed by other considerations, such as a fam-
ily or professional obligation that would make it impossible to vote.
For some people, however, a political philosophy does give rise
to imperative duties of conscience. For example, persons advocat-
147 But see infra text following note 148.
148 See, e.g., K. MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 92-95 (J. Katz ed. 1964).
149 In so far as natural law theories do address the nature of good and evil, they
often tend to have religious underpinnings. For example, Thomas Hobbes argued that
the laws of nature correlate to the laws of God. See Hobbes, De Cive, in T. HOBBES, MAN
AND CITIZEN 295 (B. Gert ed. 1972) ("Because the word of God, ruling by nature only, is
supposed to be nothing but right reason ... it is manifest that the laws of God... are
only the natural laws .... "). Indeed, the natural law notions of equality embodied in the
Declaration of Independence seem to suggest a divine source: "When in the course of
human events, it becomes necessary for one people.., to assume among the powers of
earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God
entitle them .... We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights .... " The Declaration
of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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ing civil disobedience often view the duty to disobey unjust laws as a
duty of conscience. 150 Under the proposed approach, this would
not necessarily make that person's political philosophy a religion.
The person would also have to view their political philosophy as ad-
dressing the fundamental questions. But if a person views a certain
political philosophy as providing imperative duties of conscience,
perhaps even duties he would sacrifice his life for, then that person
may also view the philosophy as addressing such fundamental ques-
tions as man's role in the universe, the nature of good and evil, and
perhaps even the meaning of life and death. If a philosophy does
play such a role in a person's life, then it should be treated as a
religion with regard to that person. Similarly, if a public school
were to present philosophical teachings as a comprehensive belief
system addressing fundamental questions and creating duties of
conscience, it might well violate the establishment clause.' 5'
C. Risk of Fraudulent Claims Under The Free Exercise Clause
A strict functional definition that does not include-the element
of formal religious trappings arguably presents a greater risk of
fraudulent claims than a definition that requires or at least considers
such trappings. Since a purely functional definition considers only
whether the alleged belief or practice relates to the internal reli-
gious function of the individual, there will be less opportunity to
rely on external evidence in assessing a religious claim. However, as
I argue above, any focus on such external manifestations of religion
would tend to discriminate against unorthodox religions in a man-
ner inconsistent with the concept of religious liberty.' 52 Moreover,
the proposed approach does require that the alleged religious belief
play a certain role in the claimant's life: it must be part of a compre-
hensive belief system that addresses certain fundamental questions
and gives rise to duties of conscience. Thus, the issue in a free exer-
cise case is not simply whether the claimant sincerely believes that
the belief or practice in question is a religious belief, but whether he
sincerely believes that it plays the religious role in his life. The defi-
nition of that role provides a basis for the factfinder to question the
nature of the belief, and to assess the claimant's sincerity, thereby
reducing the likelihood of successful fraudulent claims.
150 See, e.g., M. L. KING, JR., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 82
(1968) ("one has a moral obligation to disobey unjust laws").
151 Cf Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring)
("moral or patriotic views are not by themselves 'religious,' but if they are pressed as
divine law or a part of a comprehensive belief-system that presents them as 'truth,' they
might well rise to the religious level").
152 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
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D. Risk of Undue Interference with Government Activity
In combination with the strict scrutiny test established in Sher-
bert v. Verner,153 the proposed, relatively broad definition of religion
may appear to present a serious obstacle to the government's ability
to act on behalf of the general welfare. In Sherbert, the Court indi-
cated that in order to justify an infringement on a person's free ex-
ercise of religion, the government must demonstrate a "compelling
state interest."1 54 It is unlikely, however, that the proposed inter-
pretation of religion would pose a serious threat to government ac-
tivity, even assuming vigorous free exercise protection. First, a
successful free exercise claim typically does not lead to invalidation
of a statute or of an entire government program; it simply requires
an exemption for the claimant. 155 Second, if the sincerity test is
taken seriously, and claimants are made to demonstrate the sincerity
of their claims,1 56 then it will be difficult for persons to simply fabri-
cate a belief in order to avoid a government restriction or
obligation.
Even assuming the proposed definition would lead to an un-
manageable number of exemptions, this result is more a function of
the test set out in Sherbert than of the definition. The Court could
limit the number of religious exemptions by applying the compel-
ling state interest test only in cases in which the religious belief at
issue is central to the claimant's religion. 57 Alternatively, the Court
could apply a general balancing approach, under which it would
measure the extent of the infringement of the claimant's religion
against the impact of an exemption on the state interest. 158
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment's command that the government "make
153 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
154 See id. at 406.
155 The Court's recent decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 108 S.
Ct. 1319 (1988) seems to ensure that free exercise claims cannot go further than individ-
ual exemptions from government restrictions or obligations. In Lyng, the Court held
that the free exercise clause does not "require the government to bring forward a com-
pelling justification" for "government programs which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs." Id. at 1326.
156 See supra note 126 and text following note 150.
157 Such an approach was proposed in a recent dissenting opinion by Justice Bren-
nan,joined byJustices Blackmun and Marshall. See Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1338 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting) ("I believe it appropriate ... to require some showing of'centrality' before
the Government can be required . . . to come forward with a compelling justifica-
tion .... ). The majority, however, rejected this approach. Id. at 1329.
158 Professor Greenawalt advocates a balancing approach and argues that courts al-
ready implicitly use this approach. See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 781-84, 790.
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no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof" requires an interpretation of religion that will
allow the courts to distinguish between religious and nonreligious
belief. On the other hand, the purpose of the religion clauses-to
ensure religious liberty for all-requires an interpretation that will
encompass the religious impulses in persons, whether these im-
pulses are expressed in the form of a traditional religion, or in the
form of a unique, unstructured, personal religion. These two goals
are served by defining religion in terms of the religious function in
an individual's life-addressing the fundamental questions of
human existence and providing a guide for how to conduct one's
life. The proposed definition embodies this religious function and
provides a specific, but flexible guide for determining what is reli-
gion in both free exercise and establishment clause cases.
Ben Clements
